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THE CONSTITUTION  OUTSIDE  THE COURTS:
A PRELIMINARY  INQUIRY
MARK  V. TUSHNET"
Constitutional  law  is  obsessed  with  the  Supreme  Court  and  with  the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" ofjudicial review.  Scholars note in passing that
the  Constitution requires  federal  and state legislators  and executive officials  to
take an oath "to support this Constitution,"'  but there has been little systematic
attention to the  implications of the  obligation thereby imposed  on non-judicial
officials.  Most  of  the  scholarship  on  the  question  deals  with  the  issue  of
whether legislators and executive officials may take constitutional considerations
into account  when they make their decisions.2  In this form  the issue is largely
uninteresting.  However,  the  issue  gains  some  interest  when  officials,  after
taking  constitutional considerations  into account,  end up disagreeing  with what
the  courts  have  said  on  the  same  question,  or what  the officials  believe  the
A different version of this article was delivered as the Seegers Lecture in April  1991.  I thank
Dean Edward  McGlynn  Gaffney for  inviting  me to deliver the  lecture,  the  faculty  at Valparaiso
University School  of Law  for  helpful  comments  on  it,  and participants  in a  faculty  workshop  at
Georgetown  University Law Center for their comments.
1.  U.S.  CONST.,  art.  VI,  para. 3.
2.  Paul Brest, 7he Conscientious  Legislator's  Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L.  REV.  585  (1975);  Paul  Brest,  Congress  as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Powers to
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21  GA.  L.  REV.  57  (1986).  Sanford  Levinson  has  explored  some
implications of the oath  required  by statute  (not by the  Constitution) for naturalization,  SANFORD
LEVINSON,  CONSTITUTIONAL  FAiTH  103-06  (1988) [hereinafter  LEvINSON].  Occasional references
to  the  issue  crop  up  in  discussions of  the  amendment  process,  see,  e.g.,  Bruce  Ackerman,
Constitutional  Politics/Constitutional  Law, 99 YALE L. J. 453  (1989);  Akhil R.  Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited:  Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,  55  U.  CHi.  L. REv.  1043 (1988).
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courts  would say were  they to face  the question.3  There  is, I believe,  a much
richer  terrain  to explore.
Of course non-judicial officials must follow the Constitution, but to say that
is to say little.  The interesting question is, how should non-judicial officials go
about  following  the  Constitution?  Lawyers  whose  primary  focus  is  judicial
review almost naturally say that non-judicial officials should do what judges do
when  they face  constitutional  questions.  This response  has  two  components.
First,  legislators  and  executive  officials  should  put  aside  ordinary  political
concerns when they address constitutional questions,  and should instead devote
their  efforts  to  developing  a  principled  understanding  of  the  constitutional
provisions  that bear on  the  problem at  hand.  Second,  where  the courts  have
already  developed  a  framework  for dealing  with  the  problem,  legislators  and
executive officials should address  it in the terms -- presumptively  principled -
that  the  courts  have  made  available  to  them.  A  stronger  version  of  this
component  is that legislators  commit what Stephen  Carter has usefully called  a
"constitutional  impropriety"  if they reach  a conclusion  different from  the one
they  honestly  believe  the  courts  would  reach  or,  indeed,  will reach  when
litigation brings the question  to the courts.4
I  believe  that an  alternative  description  of how  legislators and  executive
officials ought to behave better fits the constitutional scheme.  As a preliminary
I  distinguish among  three  ways  of deciding:  by  reference  to  principles,  by
reference  to policy, and by reference to politics.  The distinction I draw between
principles  and  policy  roughly  tracks  Ronald  Dworkin's  similar  distinction:
Decisions based on policy are predicated on consideration of what would be best
for  the  society  overall,  while  decisions  based  on  principle  are  based  on
considerations of individual rights.'  A legislator makes a political  decision, in
3.  Perhaps the most notable recent controversy on this was provoked by the argument made by
former  Attorney-General  Edwin  Meese  that  because  the  Constitution,  not the  decisions  of the
Supreme Court, was the supreme law of the land,  non-judicial officials were entitled  to follow their
views of the Constitution notwithstanding contrary judicial views.  See Edwin  Meese III,  7he Law
of the  Constitution,  61  TUL.  L.  REV.  979  (1987).  See  also Frank H.  Easterbrook,  Presidential
Review, 40  CASE  W.  REs.  L. REv.  905  (1989-90)  [hereinafter  Easterbrook].  My  views on this
question are  expressed in Mark Tushnet,  The  Supreme  Couri,  the Supreme  Law of the Land,  and
Attorney  General Meese:  A  Comment,  61  TUL. L.  REv.  1017 (1987).
4.  Stephen L.  Carter,  Constitutional Improprieties:  Reflections on Mistretta,  Morrison, and
Administrative Government, 57 U.  CHI.  L. REv.  357 (1990).  Carter uses the term  "constitutional
impropriety"  in a  slightly different  way  from mine,  and  I do not mean  to suggest that his  use has
the implications that I draw from my use of the term.
5.  RONALD DWORKIN,  TAKING RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).  Dworkin's distinction has been
widely criticized,  and it may be that in the end the distinction cannot be sustained.  Indeed,  I will
argue that the  courts have not honored  the distinction  drawn by  Dworkin in wide ranges of their
constitutional decision-making.  See infra  text accompanying  notes  16-17.  Yet,  for  purposes of
rough exposition the distinction does capture differences  in orientation that it seems worthwhile  to
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contrast,  when  she casts  a  vote because  she believes  that it will enhance  her
prospects  for re-election,  for election to higher office,  or for achieving  some
other goal that is a  source of personal satisfaction  to her.6
My general  argument  is that,  across a wide  range of constitutional  issues
presented to  legislators and executive officials,  there is nothing constitutionally
improper with making a political decision.  Indeed,  with respect to an important
subset of constitutional  questions -- roughly, those  dealing  with the separation
of powers within the national government and between the national and the state
governments  -- legislators ought to make  political decisions;  the constitutional
scheme  rests  on the assumption  that that is how  they will behave,  and if they
deviate  from  that prescription  the  chances  are  that  the outcome will itself be
constitutionally improper.  I will also argue more specifically that there are good
reasons for legislators to be wary of structuring their deliberations in the terms
set by  the doctrines elaborated by the courts.  In part that is because the courts'
doctrines may respond to concerns going to the ability of the courts themselves
to implement  one  rather  than  an alternative doctrinal  approach.  But,  in part
legislators ought to consider  abjuring the courts'  terms  because the polity will
lose an important  source of insight into the constitutional scheme  if they  do -
or,  to put  it positively,  legislators  may  make  a distinctive contribution  to  the
development  of  a  society  regulated  by  the  Constitution  if they  think  about
constitutional  issues in terms different from the terms  the courts use.
I.  THE CONSTrrUTION  OUTSME THE COURTS:  A  SURVEY  OF PROBLEMS
I begin by providing a survey of the situations in which the Constitution is
somehow  discussed  outside  the  courts  in  ways  deserving  detailed  analysis.
Obviously,  constitutional  questions  arise  outside  the  courts  when  someone
objects  to  a  legislative proposal  on  the  ground  that,  if enacted,  the  proposal
would be  unconstitutional.  The proposal  would,  it might be  said,  violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,  or the proposal might violate the
principles of separation  of powers.  The most  interesting  questions here  arise
when the proponent says,  "I know that the courts will,  or are extremely likely
to,  find my proposal unconstitutional,  but we ought to adopt it anyway."  An
interesting variant on this problem occurs when the proponent of legislation says
that,  not only  is  it sound  as a  matter of public  policy (and  advantageous  as a
matter of politics, of course),  but that it is compelled by  the Constitution.  The
proponent might say,  "If we don't act, the courts will force us  to,  and we may
be less happy  about acting under the gun,  and within a framework  established
note.
6.  I  will  argue  that this  notion of political  decision-making  is  more complicated  than  might
initially  appear, because some  legislators  may enhance their electoral prospects  by behaving  in a
principled way - that is,  they may advance their political careers  by standing above politics.
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for us by the courts,  than if we take the initiative."  Or,  more interestingly,  the
proponent  might  say,  "[a]dmittedly,  the  courts  have  not  yet  said  that  the
Constitution  requires  us  to  enact  a  program  like  this,  and  indeed  they  are
unlikely  to  say  that  in  the  near  future.  Even  so,  the  program  is  not  only
consistent with the Constitution -- everything we do has to be that -- it actually
implements the values that the Constitution expresses. "I
Former  Attorney  General  Edwin  Meese  brought  a  related  aspect  of  the
Constitution outside the courts to public attention.  What, Meese asked,  should
a public official do in response to a judicial interpretation of the Constitution that
she believes is deeply wrong?  In particular,  under what circumstances  may such
an official simply disregard what the courts have said, because the courts, as the
official  sees  it, have  misinterpreted  the Constitution?  Merely  by asking these
questions,  Meese attracted many  hostile responses,  though it must be  said that
one reason  for the adverse reaction  surely was that Meese's critics disagreed as
much with the counter-interpretations  of the Constitution that Meese offered as
with the fact that he rejected some of the Supreme  Court's interpretations.8
A  third  example  of constitutional  interpretation  outside  the  courts  is the
political  questions  doctrine  and  related  aspects  of the  Constitution.  Properly
understood,  the  political  questions  doctrine  identifies  provisions  in  the
Constitution  whose  interpretation  is  left  to  the  political  branches.  Consider
United States v.  Richardson 9  as  an  example.  The plaintiff there  argued  that
Congress'  failure to make public the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a  failure  that  persisted  for  nearly  thirty  years  by  the  time  the  litigation  was
concluded, violated the constitutional requirement that "a Statement and Account
of the Receipts  and Expenditures  of all public Money shall be published  from
time to time. " "  The Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise this
claim,  but it used  language  strongly hinting of "political questions"  concerns.
Had  the Court explicitly  said  that  the  question of whether  Congress's  actions
were consistent with the "statement and account" clause was a political question,
the Court would have said that  the Constitution left it up to Congress to decide
what  practices  were  consistent  with  the  requirement  that  a  statement  of
7.  See,  e.g.,  Charles  L.  Black,  Jr.,  Further Reflections  on the  Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood,  86  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1103  (1986);  Peter  B.  Edelman,  The  Next  Century of Our
Constitution: Rethinking Our  Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINoS L. J.  1 (1987),  both dealing with an
asserted constitutional right to material well-being at some minimum level (a "right to welfare"),  not
yet  acknowledged  by  the  courts.  Both  Black  and  Edelman  suggest  that  the  courts  ought  to
acknowledge such a  right; the  issue  I am addressing arises  even if, and perhaps  especially if, they
do not and (perhaps) ought not.
8.  See Symposium, Perspectives  on the Authoritativeness  of  Supreme Court  Decisions,  61 TUL.
L.  REV.  977 (1987).
9.  418  U.S.  166 (1974).
10.  U.S.  CONST.,  art. I,  § 9,  cl.  7.
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expenditures be published "from  time to time."
The  political  questions  doctrine  is  a. judicially  developed  doctrine  of
constitutional  law,  which  has  been  articulated,  of course,  in  litigated  cases.
There  are,  however,  areas  closely  related  to  those  covered  by  the  political
questions doctrine, as to which essentially the same questions arise even though
no litigation has occurred to occasion judicial comment.  Consider,  for example,
the issue that arises recurrently over the proper range of considerations Senators
may take into account when deciding whether or not to approve a nomination of
a judge, and the related issue of the proper scope of senatorial  questioning of a
nominee.  These  issues  are  constitutional  because  they implicate  the  relations
among  the  three  branches.  And,  the  traditional  materials  of  constitutional
exegesis  -- text,  The Federalist Papers, and the like - can  be used  to analyze
the constitutional questions."  Should they be?  Or,  may  a  Senator's  decision
on  what  questions  to  ask,  and  what  considerations  to  take  into  account,  be
predicated solely  on political  concerns?
A  fourth example  of "the Constitution outside the courts"  is provided  by
the process of constitutional amendment.  There is  the fundamental  question of
whether some amendments of the Constitution would be so inconsistent with the
values  embedded  in the document  that they would be  "unconstitutional."  The
possibilities range from the pointed,  though absurd -- could the Constitution be
amended  to make  California  a  hereditary  monarchy  (on  the  theory  that  the
republican form of government  clause stands as an obstacle to the full use of the
states  as laboratories  of social experimentation)?  -- to the dramatic -- could the
Constitution be amended  to eliminate the first amendment  (or to  make it clear
that  the  states  were  not  bound  by  the  restrictions  imposed  on  the  national
government  by the first eight amendments)?"
The  rhetoric  of  the  1989-90  discussion  of the  proper  response  to  the
Supreme  Court's  flag-burning decisions  suggests an  interesting variant  on this
problem.  When  Congress  considered a proposal  to  amend  the Constitution to
make  it  possible  for  governments  to prohibit  flag-burning,  opponents  of the
proposal argued that it was unwise to amend  the Bill of Rights for the first time
in 200 years.  Yet,  the proposal might have been characterized  as an attempt to
return  the First Amendment  to its proper interpretation,  one  that the Supreme
Court had mistakenly abandoned.  Similarly, if conservatives suggested that the
Constitution be  amended  to  eliminate  the  constraints  the  Supreme  Court  has
imposed  on  state  governments  through  its  interpretation  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment as incorporating most of the Bill of Rights, a similar rhetoric would
11.  See,  e.g.,  Bruce  Fein,  Commentary:  A  Circumscribed  Senate  Confirmation  Role,  102
HARV.  L.  REv.  672 (1989).
12.  For a discussion of the question,  see LEVINSON,  supra note  2,  at  126-51.
Tushnet: The Constitution Outside the Courts:  A Preliminary Inquiry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992442  VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  26
ensue even  though proponents of the change might cogently argue  that all they
wanted  to  do was to get  the proper  interpretation of the  Constitution back in
force.  The rhetoric of amending  the Constitution reveals important facets of the
public's understanding  of the Constitution -- an understanding  that, of course,
is located  outside the courts.
13
A  final  topic  related  to  "the  Constitution  outside  the  courts"  involves
identifying when the phenomenon of constitutional discussion outside the courts
occurs.  Bruce  Ackerman has  argued  that there are  "constitutional  moments"
when the public generally  considers fundamental  questions of the constitutional
order,  and that the courts should interpret the Constitution with an eye to those
moments. '4  Constitutional discussions occur outside the courts more often than
in Ackerman's  constitutional  moments.  Consistent  with my general  theme,  I
suggest  that  questions  about  the  proper  scope  and  form  of  constitutional
deliberation  outside the  courts arise  with particular  urgency  in  situations  that
political scientists called  "divided  government,"  a condition that we have been
experiencing  for  the  past  generation.  If that  suggestion  is  correct,  the  last
chapter  of my argument must, as I hope  it will eventually,  address the political
context of my  discussion itself.
II.  CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS
What  does  the  Constitution  mean  to  a  legislator  who  disagrees  with  a
Supreme  Court  interpretation  of  the  Constitution?  The  most  interesting
questions arise in such cases, or where the courts will probably never offer their
interpretations of the Constitution.  The controversy over the constitutional status
of laws prohibiting flag-burning is a recent example  in the first category,  while
the questions that arose  during the Watergate affair over the meaning of "high
crimes  and  misdemeanors"  in  the  constitutional  clauses  dealing  with
impeachment  is an example  in the second.  I believe, however,  that we can  get
a better understanding  of the  underlying issues by starting  with an apparently
less  difficult category.
A.  Judicial  Balancing and the Constitution Outside the Courts
The substantive constitutional law regulating many areas calls for the courts
13.  Levinson's discussion of the public  rhetoric  of the Second  Amendment provides another
illustration,  although the  substance  of that  rhetoric  does not,  I think,  shed  much  light on  general
questions about the Constitution outside the courts.  Sanford  Levinson,  The Embarrassing  Second
Amendment,  99  YALE L. J. 637 (1989).
14.  Bruce Ackerman,  The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J.  1013
(1984).  See also James  Pope,  Republican Moments:  The Role of Direct Popular  Power in the
American Constitutional  Order, 139 U.  PA.  L. REV.  287 (1990).
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to  balance  competing  considerations  in  assessing  the  constitutionality  of  a
challenged  action. 5   In  the  terms  I  have  introduced,  those  competing
considerations implicate questions of principle and questions of policy.'6  Those
who defend  balancing  as a  technique  of constitutional  adjudication have  been
bedeviled by  the obvious question of comparative institutional competence.
Their critics argue  in  several steps.  First,  they acknowledge  that judges,
because  of their  independence  and training,  have  a comparative  advantage  in
assessing  principle, but they stress  that the advantage  is  only comparative,  not
absolute  --  a  point  that  will play  an  important  part  in  my  later  discussion.
Second,  they  suggest  that  elected  officials  have  a  comparative  advantage  in
assessing  policy.  In  part,  they  argue,  elected  officials  have  that  advantage
because  they  have  access  to better  means  of informing  themselves  about  the
consequences of alternative policies (and, recall,  "policy"  means something that
makes society better off overall).  Even if judges can use innovative techniques
of management  to  inform  themselves  about  the  implications  of  their policy
decisions, 7  still,  critics of balancing  argue,  many  aspects  of policy implicate
such a wide  range of interests  that elections are  a better  technique of assessing
those interests than any alternatives available even to the most imaginative court.
Further, elected officials have a comparative  advantage in assessing the intensity
of  public  views,  and  intensity  is  relevant  to  arriving  at  an  overall  policy
judgment.  The  critics  of  balancing  conclude  that  the  presence  of  policy
considerations  in the balancing  process  overcomes  -- "outweighs,"  one  might
say  -- the  comparative  advantage judges  concededly  have  as  to  questions  of
principle.  In short,  the critics conclude,  on balance,  that there  is no reason  to
believe  that  the judges'  determination  of the principle/policy  balance  will be
better than the determination  made by elected officials.
I  am  quite  sympathetic  to  this  criticism  of balancing  as  a  technique  of
constitutional adjudication,  but it needs elaboration  to illuminate the question of
the  Constitution  outside  the  courts.  The most  obvious defect  in  the  critics'
argument  is that it focuses on principle and policy and ignores politics.  That is,
the judges'  comparative  advantage  might be  re-established  by  stressing  that,
although the critics'  analysis of principle and policy might be correct,  it fails to
acknowledge  the role that politics plays in  decisions by elected officials.
15.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in  the Age of Balancing,  96 YALE L. J.
943  (1987).
16.  To the extent that the structure of the balancing shows that on occasion some considerations
of policy can outweigh considerations of principle,  it demonstrates that my way of using those terms
to describe  the Court's actions is different from  Dworkin's.  For him, considerations of principle
by definition "trump"  - or "outweigh,"  though the metaphor is inapt in Dworkin's scheme  and he
does not use it - considerations of policy.
17. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96  HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982);  Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89  HARV.  L. REV.  1281  (1976).
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Developing  this  argument leads me  to identify  a number of elements that
I  believe  are essential  to a  full understanding  of the  Constitution outside  the
courts.  First,  it bears  noting  that the distinction  between politics on  the one
hand and principle and policy on the other is not sharp.  Most obviously, across
a rather large domain  an official's  political interest  corresponds  to her policy
interests.  Deciding whether a statute will be better for the society overall  calls
in part for determining the statute's public impact.  An official's political interest
in election  or  re-election  will lead  her  to  be  concerned  about  making  that
determination  accurately  with  respect  to her constituents.  When  a number of
officials with different constituencies participate in determining public policy, the
overall  political  interests  may  correspond  quite  closely  to  the  overall  policy
interests.'s
In addition,  members of Congress can gain reputations,  which they turn to
electoral advantage, as "guardians of the public fisc"  or as "people with a wider
view."  Sometimes  they do  so by using some  aspects  of their power,  such as
their seniority,  to secure benefits for their constituents while refusing to engage
in log-rolling that benefits other officials.  Sometimes  they do so by  taking  the
wider view even with respect to benefits narrowly targeted on their constituency.
The general point is that some elected officials can sometimes enhance their
political  prospects  by  taking positions of principle. 9  Consider,  for  example,
18.  I should note an arguable exception to this point, typically  illustrated by log-rolling, pork-
barrel legislation.  In these situations,  the  interests of the multiple participants  lead them to  satisfy
each other through reciprocal deals, each one of which is politically advantageous to each participant
(at least in the short run),  but which in the aggregate make the society worse off overall.  These are
analogues to the game theorists'  Prisoners'  Dilemma game.
I am unsure of the implications of this point for the general analysis.  First, the core examples
tend  to involve  what the Court has come to  call  "social  and economic legislation,"  as  to which  it
provides little oversight.  That might mean that, although the performance of elected officials is not
very good,  the constitutional system as a whole does  not constrain them.  Yet,  if the argument  is
correct, it would  provide a basis for revising contemporary doctrine in these areas.  Alternatively,
the argument might mean that there are no considerations of principle that the courts could sensibly
invoke, either because of limitations on their institutional capacity or because of some broader moral
skepticism about problems in the relevant domain.
Second,  I  have suggested that elected  officials  may gain political  advantage in the short run
from this sort of legislation,  thereby hinting that they may not get such advantage in the longer run.
Here  too the  analogue  to  the  Prisoners'  Dilemma  may  hold.  Game  theorists  have  shown  that
participants in Prisoners'  Dilemmas games rationally should reach the socially  desirable outcome if
they are  engaged in  a  series of games and do not know when the  series will end.  Some elected
officials have a longer time-horizon than the next election,  and to that extent they may factor long-
term  considerations  - that  log-rolling  leads  to  inflation,  for  example  - into  their  political
calculations.
19.  Controversy  exists in the relationship  between liberal  political theory and  the attitudes  of
citizens in  public discussions.  It  is controversial  whether a person can offer as reasons arguments
that are not personally motivating and yet remain consistent with liberal political theory.  I deal with
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the failure of a proposed  constitutional  amendment  dealing  with flag-burning.
I believe  that one  important reason  for its failure  was  that some  members  of
Congress  came  to believe  that  their  political  position with  their  constituents
would  be  enhanced  if  they  "stood  up  for  the  Constitution"  by  opposing  an
amendment  to  "change  the  First  Amendment."'  What  then  becomes
interesting  is  the  distribution  of  members'  decisions  between  "principled
political"  action and  "purely political"  action.  If principle in the legislature is
only a partial  substitute for principle  in courts,  perhaps  we ought to hope  that
legislators  would  act  in  a  principled  political  way  when  their  actions  were
unlikely to be reviewed  by the courts,  and could be less concerned about purely
political  actions when their actions were likely to be reviewed.
Some other aspects  of the argument  I have been making should be made
explicit.  I have been attempting to weaken the claims made on behalf ofjudicial
balancing  to the extent that those claims rest on the proposition that,  whatever
else  might  be  said,  decisions  by  elected  officials  are  more  significantly
influenced  by politics than by policy and principle.  So far I have been arguing
that politics sometimes encompasses policy and principle.  Even so, the defender
of judicial  balancing  should  respond,  the underlying  question is  comparative:
Are  elected  officials  more influenced  by  politics  (independent  of policy  and
principle)  than  are judges?  The  answer  to  that question  must of course  be
"Yes,"  but the answer may not be  as significant as might initially be thought.
The  case  for judicial balancing would  be strong if three conditions were
met.  First, the overall balance  should take into account only considerations of
principle  and policy, and should not be contaminated to the slightest degree  by
political considerations.  Second,  even if some elected officials sometimes fold
policy  and  principle  into  their political  calculations,  sometimes  they  do  not,
thereby  contaminating  the outcome of their deliberations.  Third, judges never
contaminate  their  decisions  by  injecting  political  considerations  into  their
balancing  of policy and principle.
I  doubt  that  anyone  in  a  post-legal  realist  world  believes  that  the  third
condition is satisfied,  and I certainly  do not.  Yet, if it is not,  the argument for
judicial balancing has to be reconstructed.  The obvious modification of the third
this controversy in Mark Tushnet, "The Limits of Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic",  in
THE ROLE  OF RELIGION  IN  THE MAJNG  OF PUBLIC  POLICY (James F.  Wood, Jr.  & Derek Davis
eds.,  1991).
20.  I  do not mean  to suggest that  everyone  who opposed the amendment made  that political
calculation.  Others may have concluded that they would lose votes in the next election because of
their  position, though not enough votes to mean that  they would lose  their seats.  Some Congress
members may have concluded that defending the Constitution,  as they saw it, was worthwhile  even
if the end  result was the loss of their positions.
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condition is that judges contaminate their decisions less frequently  than elected
officials  do.  That  is,  although judges  sometimes  either  think about  or  are
unconsciously influenced by political considerations (defined in the broad sense
I offered at the outset, and not confined to concern  for re-election),  they do so
less often than  elected  officials  do.  That has to be true.  Yet,  modifying the
third  condition  requires  that  the  first  be modified  as  well.  The  defense  of
judicial balancing would then turn on the propositions that some contamination
by  politics  is  acceptable,  too  much  contamination  is  undesirable,  the
contamination that occurs in the courts is acceptable,  and the contamination that
occurs  in legislatures is not.
These propositions could generate two models of the policy-making process.
In  one,  the  courts  would  balance  because  the  legislative  outcome  was
"inappropriately"  influenced by politics.  Here the notion of "inappropriateness"
has some substantive content.  Precisely because we are examining a balancing
model,  though,  I  believe  that  we  cannot  invoke  substantive  notions  as  a
constraint on legislative outcomes;  those notions are,  in Dworkin's sense, purely
principled,  and no balancing would be justified.  The alternative is a threshold
model.  Courts could balance whenever the policy-making  process was affected
by  a degree  of politics exceeding  some  floor.2'  Courts could balance,  that is,
when "too much"  politics came  into play.
The difficulty  for judicial balancing's  defenders  now  should be  obvious.
If elected  officials sometimes  really  do take  policy and principle  into account,
figuring out where  to set the threshold of excessive political influence  is likely
to be exceedingly  difficult.  That concern should be heightened by noting that,
in a post-legal realist world, judges influenced to some degree by politics would
themselves  be deciding where  the threshold was.
I  am  not  trying  to  develop  a  complete  defense  or  criticism  of judicial
balancing.  The analysis of balancing I have offered does, however,  have some
implications  for an  analysis  of the  Constitution outside  the  courts.  In areas
where the courts will apply a doctrine of balancing,  elected officials can behave
pretty much as  they otherwise  would:  They can  worry  about politics,  policy,
and principle without  framing  their concerns  in  constitutional  terms,  because
courts ought to  balance  the competing  considerations in pretty much the same
way,  and  the  differences  between  courts  and  elected  officials  are  not  great
enough to warrant substantial changes in how the elected officials behave.
21.  I  note  the  possibility  of  a  further  elaboration  in  which judicial  balancing  would  be
appropriate where the policy-making process was not affected by a degree of  concern for policy and
principle that exceeded some floor.  I doubt that we would get much more from that elaboration than
I extract from the less elaborate  version.
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The  threshold  model  of  the  domain  in  which  judicial  balancing  is
appropriate has another implication.  To draw it out I must distinguish between
multi-member decision-makers and single-member decision-makers.  The model
for the former,  of course,  is the legislature itself.  The  model  for the latter is
not, however,  a governor or a President but is, instead,  the police officer on the
beat,  making  a  decision  to  arrest  or  search  without  a  warrant.'  I  treat
executive  officials as multi-member  bodies because this analysis deals with the
real  role of politics in constitutional deliberations outside the courts, and it must
therefore take a realistic view of how decision-makers  operate.  Certainly at the
national  level,  the  "President's"  participation  in  constitutional  discussions  is
influenced  by numerous  subordinate agents,  at  least  some of whom have  the
kinds of partial commitments  to principle that I have  said some legislators do.'
The  reason  for  drawing  this  distinction  is  that,  in  a  threshold  model
involving  a  multi-member  decision-maker,  one  participant  can  ask  herself,
"Suppose  I  rely  solely  on politics  in making this decision;  will that push  the
decision taken  by the body  as a whole  over the threshold  that the courts have
defined?"  If the answer is that it will not,  I am hard-pressed  to describe  that
decision-maker's behavior as undermining the promotion of constitutional values
outside the court.  Obviously,  the point does not hold with respect  to  single-
member  decision-makers,  who  do  directly  undermine  constitutional  values  if
they, being the only ones in the premises, disregard principle.  And, even when
dealing with a member of a multi-member body, the analysis must assume -- as
I believe it is realistic to assume -- that the member who asks the question about
how other members  are likely to behave is not a Kantian who takes as a maxim,
"Act in a way that your action could be taken by  everyone,"  and that the other
members  will not treat her decision as a defection in a Prisoners'  Dilemma game
that justifies  abandoning  their  previous  commitments  to  decisions  based  on
principle and policy.
The argument thus far can be summarized:  Where  the Constitution inside
the courts involves a balancing of interests,  the Constitution outside the courts
consists  of elected  officials  acting  as they  otherwise would.  I  turn next  to  a
brief  exploration  of a  part  of the  terrain  that  others  have  explored,  where
Congress "rejects"  a constitutional decision by the Supreme  Court by enforcing
a  right  that  the  Court  refused  to  enforce.  Most  of what  has  gone  before
illuminates  this problem, but it is less interesting  than other dimensions of the
issue of the Constitution outside  the courts.
22.  The Court acknowledged the "policy-making" role of police officers in Foley v. Connellie,
435  U.S.  291  (1978).
23.  For a discussion,  see Easterbrook,  supra note  3.
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B.  Congressional 'Overruling"
As  indicated  earlier,  most  commentators  who  discuss  the  propriety  of
congressional  rejection  of judicial  interpretations  of the  Constitution  have  a
standard  set of examples.  These  examples  all involve litigation in which the
Court was invited to hold that the  Constitution protected  a specified right,  the
Court  rejected  the  invitation,  and  Congress  thereupon  enacted  a  statute
protecting  the  right.  Most  of  the  examples,  though,  raise  few  interesting
analytic issues, because they typically involve a legislative decision to protect an
interest  that is well within the  legislature's  authority to protect.
Consider,  for example,  Lyng  v.  International Union,  United Automobile
Workers.'  Congress passed a law excluding families of striking workers from
participating  in the food stamp program.  The union challenged  the statute on
the ground, among others, that it unconstitutionally impaired their rights of free
expression.  The Court disagreed.  Suppose that Congress now decides to repeal
the  "striker"  exclusion  because,  on  fuller consideration,  it concludes  that the
exclusion  does  indeed impair  free  expression  rights.  Congress'  disagreement
with the Supreme Court is largely uninteresting here, because Congress certainly
has the legislative authority to protect interests associated with free expression,
like  the  strikers',  even  if the  interests  are  not  themselves  protected  by  the
Constitution.
The  issue  becomes  somewhat  more  interesting  in  two situations.  First,
suppose members  of Congress say,  "We would not include strikers  in the  food
stamp program if it were up to us to make a pure policy choice.  But,  despite
what  the  Supreme  Court has  said,  we have  become convinced  that  excluding
them from the program actually  does violate their constitutional  rights."  Here
the  members  of  Congress  are  relying  on  a  principled  interpretation  of  the
Constitution, different from the Court's, to override their policy-based concerns.
I  confess,  however,  that I  cannot  find anything at  all troubling in this  sort of
rhetoric.'
Second,  occasionally  questions might arise about whether an interest  does
fall  within a  legislature's  general  legislative  competence.'  For example,  the
Supreme Court held that neither the Fourth nor the First Amendments required
state police officers  to  rely on subpoenas  rather than search  warrants  to obtain
24.  485 U.S.  360 (1988).
25.  It is linked to the point noted above, supra note 23,  regarding legislative creation of rights
to public assistance.
26.  State  legislatures  are,  as  a matter  of  federal  constitutional  law,  bodies  with  general
legislative  authority;  therefore  the  problem  I discuss  here  can  arise  only  in  connection  with
congressional  action.
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evidence  from  newspapers."  Congress  responded  to the decision  by  barring
newsroom  searches  except  under  limited  circumstances;  the  effect  was  to
prohibit  searches  that  the  Supreme  Court  said  were  constitutionally
permissible.'
Applied to federal officers, the statute isjust like the hypothesized "striker"
statute -- Congress  exercised  its authority  to  regulate  the  activities of its own
employees  to promote an  interest  in privacy  that,  though not protected  by  the
Constitution, was within its authority to protect.  Applied to state police officers,
though, the statute may be more problematic.  What is the source of Congress'
authority to enact  a statute regulating their behavior?  The lawyer's immediate
response  is,  "Section  5  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  Section  5  gives
Congress  the power  to  enforce the Due Process  and Equal Protection Clauses
of that Amendment.  The difficulty,  of course,  is that the Supreme  Court has
already held that the interest in being free of newsroom searches  is not covered
by  the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The sense in which
Congress'  action  amounts  to  "enforcing"  the  Due  Process  Clause,  then,  is
obscure.
The  Court  furnished its answer  in Katzenbach v.  Morgan,'  as  implicitly
elaborated  in  Garcia v.  San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority."  The
sequence of events in Morgan was the same as in the newsroom search situation:
a decision by the Supreme  Court refusing to hold a  state law unconstitutional,
followed by  a federal  statute making  it unlawful to enforce  the state law.  The
Court upheld Congress'  action on a variety of theories.  One was that Congress
might be understood to be enforcing  a constitutional right other than the one at
issue  in  the  Court's  initial  decision.  So,  for  example,  the  Court  in  the
newsroom case might have held that the rights of the newspaper itself were not
violated by  a search,  but Congress might have determined  that the rights of the
newspaper's  readers were violated.
A  second,  more important theory was that the only objection to the statute
was  that  it lay  outside  any of the  powers  granted  to Congress.  This  is  an
objection that sounds in federalism:  state legislatures have general authority, but
Congress has only the powers granted to it in the Constitution, precisely in order
to  preserve  a  domain  of  state  autonomy.  Garcia holds,  however,  that
federalism-based restrictions on congressional power will not be enforced by  the
courts;  rather,  the  states'  interests  in  autonomy  are  to  be  protected  by  the
27.  Zurcher v.  Stanford  Daily, 436 U.S.  547 (1978).
28.  Privacy Protection  Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.  §2000aa (1988).
29.  384 U.S.  641  (1966).
30.  469 U.S.  528 (1985).
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national  political process. 3'
In  short,  when  Congress  extends  "rights"  that  the  Court has  refused  to
recognize,  no  analytic  conundrums  arise.  Either  Congress  is  exercising  its
authority to protect interests  as  a matter of policy, or  it is exercising  a power
that the Court itself has said is not subject to judicial supervision.  When courts
will not supervise legislative decisions,  though,  a new set of problems arises.
C.  Situations of No Judicial  Review
On the face of it, it would seem obvious that we should be more concerned
about officials'  failure to  think in constitutional  terms where  their actions will
not be  reviewed  by  the  courts.  Whatever  else  might  be  said about judicial
balancing,  for example,  it does at least provide an opportunity for the injection
of principled concerns into a process  that might have undervalued  them.  If the
courts are not going to backstop the officials, though, constitutional values might
simply be ignored throughout  the policy-making process.  These  are situations,
we can  say,  in which the meaning of the Constitution is determined  solely and
completely by the actions of the political branches.  One might think, therefore,
that an analysis  of the  Constitution outside  the courts  has  to  conclude that in
situations  where  the courts  will not review  the  actions  elected  officials  take,
those  officials  ought  to  incorporate  constitutional  concerns  into  their
deliberations more than they otherwise would.  Unless they do, we will end up
with  a  Constitution  whose  meaning  is  determined  without  reference  to  the
Constitution.
I believe that  such a conclusion  is at  least quite overstated  and  that,  in a
rather large range of situations where  elected officials can anticipate no judicial
review of their actions,  those officials  need not alter their  behavior  to  assure
"better"  protection of constitutional values.  Before  explaining why,  I have to
re-emphasize  two points,  because  they tend  to be overlooked  in the  course of
discussions of the Constitution outside the courts.  First, nothing in the argument
that follows requires that elected officials ignore the principles they might derive
from the Constitution in  their deliberations.  Although I will note some points
at which it might be a good thing were those officials to ignore  those principles
in  some  sense,  the basic  argument  is only that elected  officials  need not pay
attention  to  them.  Second,  some  elected  officials,  whether  for  reasons  of
principle  or  politics,  will  in  fact  pay  attention  to  constitutional  principles
anyway.  The argument,  in  this aspect,  is only  that neither they nor their  less
"sensitive"  colleagues  have  to  change  what  they  would  otherwise  do  out  of
31.  Even if Garcia is overruled,  it seems unlikely that statutes like the Privacy Protection Act,
which supplant substantive decisions made  by state legislatures but do not alter the states'  decision-
making processes, would  be impaired.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 [1992], Art. 1
http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss2/11992]  CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS  451
concern  for the Constitution outside the courts.
The argument  takes its starting point from the observation that in a system
in which Marbury v. Madison plays a central role, situations in which the courts
will not review the actions of elected officials do not just happen.  Rather,  the
courts  decide  to  refrain  from  review.  The  argument  that  follows  is  an
elaboration of the following:  Courts  refrain  from reviewing  certain decisions
because  they believe  that constitutional  values  cannot be better protected  than
through the operation of the ordinary political  system.
I need  to distinguish two kinds of reasons for refraining from review.  I call
these  "court-centered"  and  "legislature-centered"  reasons.32   The  most
convenient  example  for my purposes  is Garcia.  In holding  that it would not
invalidate  national  legislation  because  the  legislation  assertedly  violated
constitutional norms of federal-state relations,  the Court divided its analysis into
two parts.  First, Justice Blackmun argued,  the Court's attempt to specify a test
to determine when legislation was unconstitutional on those grounds had failed.
The  Court  had  focused  on  whether  the  legislation  attempted  to  regulate
traditional  governmental  activities  but,  Justice  Blackmun  said,  it had  proven
impossible to identify  such activities in any coherent way and to justify why the
activities so identified ought to be free of federal regulation.  This is what I call
a "court-centered"  reason.
Second,  he  argued,  members  of  Congress  have  electoral  incentives  to
respond  to concerns  that  what they  propose  to  do would  disrupt federal-state
relations in a way  that contravenes  the norms embedded  in the Constitution as
a whole -- the norms,  that is, dealing with the powers of the states and with the
powers of the national government.  This is what I call a "legislature-centered"
reason  for refraining  from judicial review.
There  are  other  contexts  in which  these  types of reasons  appear.  One
component of the political questions doctrine,  for example,  counsels the courts
to refrain  from acting when they cannot find "judicially manageable  standards"
to  define  the  boundaries  of constitutionally  permissible  actions  - a  court-
centered  reason.33  One  version  of traditional rational-basis  review holds  that
the  courts  should  be  extremely  generous  in reviewing  social  and  economic
legislation because it is the product of ordinary legislative bargaining,  in which
legislators  do -- and  may,  without  committing  a constitutional  impropriety  -
respond  simply  to  the  electoral  pressures  they  face  --  a  legislature-centered
32.  A  more precise  formulation of the latter would  be "elected-official-centered  reasons,"  but
that is obviously too awkward,  and the examples I develop  involve legislatures anyway.
33.  See Baker v.  Carr, 369 U.S.  186 (1962).
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reason  for restraint.'
Often the two  types of reason act together, as in Garcia.  For example,  it
is  almost  never  true  that  the  courts  could  not  devise  manageable  standards.
There is, after all, the ever-reliable  fallback of a balancing test, as proposed, in
different versions,  by  the dissenting opinions of Justices Powell and O'Connor
in Garcia.  I have suggested elsewhere that the political questions doctrine can
be  both  explained  and justified  by  considering,  not  only  the  court-centered
reason I have mentioned, but also the degree to which we can reasonably expect
electoral  incentives  to operate  so that what comes  out of the political branches
is no more likely to threaten constitutional norms than would occur if the courts
were authorized  to review their decisions.35
Consider  now  a  legislator  who  is  contemplating  a  proposal  where  she
knows that judicial review is not going to occur because of either court-centered
or legislature centered  reasons.  At first glance,  it would seem obvious that to
the extent that courts will refrain from review  for legislature-centered  reasons,
the legislator may properly respond solely to political considerations.  After all,
the courts  have structured  their doctrine precisely  with the understanding  that
legislators  may  so  respond,  and  the  courts  have  decided  that,  all  things
considered,  the constitutional order will be best  respected if they refrain  from
review.3
Before addressing a different level of difficulty, I will consider the situation
where the courts refrain  from review at least in part for court-centered  reasons.
34.  See,  e.g.,  United  States R.R.  Bd.  v.  Fritz, 449  U.S.  166  (1980).  I refer in  the  text to
traditional rational basis review to distinguish these cases from City of Cleburne v.  Cleburne Living
Center,  473  U.S.  432 (1985),  which  purports to apply rational  basis review.  Clebune  arguably
confirms the long-heralded shift  away from traditional  rational basis review to  rational basis with
bite.  See,  e.g.,  Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86  HARV.  L. REV.  1 (1972).  I doubt that it does, because
the case  implicated too many other concerns to take  it as  a general model  for what the Court will
do in more traditional areas.  Similarly,  I am skeptical,  on both descriptive  and normative grounds,
of the contention by Cass Sunstein that the Court, across  all  areas of constitutional law,  does  and
should ask for more than responsiveness to electoral incentives.  See Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American  Public Law,  38  STAN.  L. REv.  29 (1985).
35.  HowARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET,  FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  POLICY AND PRAcTicE 238-39
(2d ed.  1987).  Note the importance of the comparative judgment here.  In the absence of a political
questions  doctrine,  the  courts  would  be  authorized  to  intervene.  Being  imperfect,  they  will
sometimes  invalidate  actions taken  by the political  branches  that do  not contravene constitutional
values.  These  errors  themselves are  constitutional  improprieties.  The comparative  question  is
whether  more constitutional  improprieties will  occur if we  rely  solely on electoral incentives or if
we  allow judicial review.
36.  Again I stress the necessary comparative judgments and the risk of judicial error mentioned
in the preceding footnote.
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Here  the analysis is more  complex.  The formulation in  the political questions
doctrine  seems  to  me  to  capture  the  general  difficulty,  so I  use  the  terms  of
"judicially manageable  standards"  to frame  my discussion.  In  saying that the
lack of judicially manageable  standards  should lead  the courts to refrain  from
acting,  the Court is pointing to a particular incapacity  of the courts,  not to the
absence  of criteria that rationally bear  on the decision at hand,  a  decision that
will be taken, with finality, by the political branches under the political questions
doctrine.  The underlying idea is that the courts need to have doctrines stated in
terms that provide reasonably clear guidance for courts  in the future, including
lower courts, whereas  the political branches may operate in a more nuanced and
less articulate way.
.I  am  skeptical  about  the  coherence  of  this  claim  about  the  different
capacities  of institutions,  but I accept it for present purposes.  Even taking the
doctrine  in its strongest  form,  it does not deny the existence of rational criteria
for action.  As  Justice Frankfurter argued  in his dissent in Baker v.  Carr,  the
difficulty  is  rather  that  there  are  too  many  considerations  that  bear  on  the
problem,  not  that  there  are  none. 7  A  slightly different  way  of putting  the
point,  and  one  that  is  somewhat  more  useful  for  my  purposes,  is  that  it  is
relatively  easy  for  the  courts  to  identify  at  a  rather  abstract  level  the
considerations  relevant  to  the  constitutional  question  presented  to  them  and
relatively hard for them to figure out what the bearing those considerations have
in the circumstances  presented.
In  the  terms  I  have  been  using,  these  considerations  raise  questions  of
policy and  principle.  If the reason  the courts  refrain  from review is entirely
court-centered,  it would  seem  that  legislators  ought  to  consider  only  these
questions  of policy and principle.  The  courts  stay  away  from  the  issue not
because  they  believe  that  the  impact  of political  concerns  is  acceptable  but
because  they  believe  that  the  courts  are  not  in  a  position  to  apply  the
considerations of policy and principle that are the only ones that properly ought
to be invoked.  At this point I must revert to a distinction I drew earlier between
the action of an individual legislator and the action of the legislature as a whole.
What  should we  say about a  legislator in  these situations if she  cast her vote
solely with  regard  to political concerns?  Suppose that there are  enough  other
legislators who  act with an eye to principle and policy,'  so that the product of
the legislature as  a whole crosses  the  threshold of principle  and policy.  The
legislator's  constituents can  decide whether  she has committed a constitutional
impropriety.  My  own inclination is to say that she has not, but that she ought
to recognize that she is running the risk that attends all non-cooperative behavior
37.  369 U.S.  186,  266 (1962)  (Frankfurter, J.,  dissenting).
38.  Again I must  note that sometimes the politically expedient thing to do is vote according to
policy and  principle.
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in Prisoners'  Dilemma situations.
Unfortunately, because it makes the argument even more complicated,  there
is  yet  another  branch  to  explore.  I  have  been  proceeding  on  the  implicit
assumption that the courts correctly have decided not to review the actions of the
political branches.  But, of course,  courts  like legislatures  make constitutional
mistakes,  and some of those mistakes  may consist of decisions to refrain from
review.  For  the  dissenters,  Garcia was  such  a  case.  To  them,  the  Court
misunderstood  the  actual  situation  in  Congress  in  relying  on  a  legislature-
centered  reason  for  refraining  from  review.  The  dissenters  believed  that  in
modem  circumstances,  members  of  Congress  actually  had  few  electoral
incentives to respond to the constitutional concerns traditionally described by the
word "federalism."
Consider  a member of Congress who agrees with the dissenters in Garcia.
That member ought,  it seems clear,  to rely on her understanding  of principle
and  policy  in casting  a vote.  There  is no  inconsistency  between  the Court's
analysis and  such an action.  More  generally,  if the courts erroneously  invoke
legislature-centered  reasons to refrain from review, legislators certainly may act
on  principle  and policy  rather  than  politics.  In  short,  as a  general  matter, 39
there is nothing constitutionally improper with a legislator who acts on principle
and policy.'
I have said repeatedly that legislators  do not act  improperly if they rely on
principle in situations where the  courts assume  that they will,  at least  to some
extent,  rely on politics.  Now I must introduce an important qualification.  To
do so I must distinguish between  direct and indirect electoral incentives.  Direct
incentives, obviously,  are those that are likely to affect the legislator's prospects
for reelection.  Indirect incentives are  those that make the legislator care  about
reelection  in the first place.
There  may be others, but the indirect incentive on which I will focus is the
power  of  the  legislature  itself.  In  the  absence  of  corruption,  few  people,  I
suspect, would be interested in serving in a legislature that was merely a rubber-
39.  With a  qualification to  be noted shortly.
40.  The situation described  in the text has a dynamic element that deserves note, though I think
that there  is little  I can  say about  it.  The very announcement by the court that it has legislature-
centered  reasons for refraining from  review may affect legislators.  It may persuade some that it  is
all  right for them to rely solely on politics.  If the court's initial  analysis was wrong, the course of
public policy may  spiral  downward,  as  a process that was already too infected  by politics becomes
even more so.  Or, more optimistically,  the court's announcement may shake legislators up.  Some
might have been relying on  the courts to bail  them out when they  acted out of political motives,
believing in their hearts, though, that principle and policy ought to govern.  Once they are told that
no one will bail them out, they may begin to act on principle and  policy.
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stamp  for decisions made elsewhere.  They  want to accomplish  something4'  or
they  want  to  exercise  power  because  exercising  power  makes  them  feel
important.  To make serving  in the legislature  worthwhile, then,  the legislator
has an electoral incentive to maintain the power of the legislature.
In the constitutional  scheme,  the most  obvious threat to  the power  of the
legislature  comes  from  the Executive  Branch.  As Madison  understood,  each
branch is "ambitious,"  seeking to extend the domain of its own authority.  The
solution Madison thought the Constitution embodied was to set ambition against
ambition.  Congress's attempts to expand its power would be met by  action by
a President  who had an indirect political incentive in  maintaining the power of
the office,  and presidential power-grabs  would be  countered  by  congressional
resistance.
Now consider a case of conflict between the President and Congress which
is unlikely to result in judicial review.  The example might be an impeachment,
in which  the conflict might be over the  definition of an impeachable  offense.
Or  it might be a hearing on the proposed  appointment of a new Justice of the
Supreme  Court,  where  the  conflict  might  be  over  the  proper  scope  of  the
Senate's inquiries into the nominee's views.  Or, we might have in mind a more
general  theory like Jesse  Choper's,  in which  the courts  are supposed to  refrain
from  reviewing  questions  of  separation  of  powers  because  each  branch  has
sufficient  political  resources  at its command  in  the battle  of ambition  against
ambition.42
Madison  believed  that  the  constitutional  system  would  work  well  if
participants  in  these  inter-branch  conflicts  responded  to  the  indirect electoral
incentive  of  maintaining  their  branch's  power.  Frequently,  indeed  almost
always,  one of the weapons in the struggle is the "Constitution card."  That is,
a President defending a controversial nominee will claim that the proper subjects
of inquiry by the Senate are the nominee's character,  integrity, and professional
qualifications.  That  claim will be backed  up by  citations  to the debates  at the
constitutional  convention,  quotations  from  The  Federalist Papers,  and  an
interpretation of the course of conduct of Presidents  and Senators over the past
two hundred years.  The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee will respond
with  a  document  saying  that  the  Constitution properly  interpreted  allows  the
Senate a scope of inquiry into the nominee's views restricted  solely by  the good
judgment of the Senate.
41.  In this way a legislator's concern for policy and principle might be considered an indirect
electoral  incentive:  Legislators want to be  elected and reelected  at least  in part because they want
to affect the shape of public policy.
42.  See JESSE  H.  CHOPER,  JUDICIAL REVIEW  AND  THE NATIONAL  POLITICAL PROCESS:  A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION  OF  THE ROLE  OF THE SUPREME  COURT (1980).
Tushnet: The Constitution Outside the Courts:  A Preliminary Inquiry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992456 VALPARAISO  UNIVERSITY  LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  26
Though the  metaphor now becomes  labored,  my  initial impulse  had been
to  say  that  the  Constitution  card  should  not  be  part  of  the  deck  in  these
controversies.  If  the  President  convinces  a  Senator  that,  as  a  matter  of
principle,  the range of senatorial  inquiry is narrow, the power of the Senate is
weakened.  Playing the Constitution card,  that is, seemed  inconsistent with the
scheme of ambition countering ambition.
On reflection I have concluded otherwise,  because  political actors  believe
that playing  the Constitution  card  affects  the outcome  of the  political  contest
between  President and  Congress.  "You  should do that because  it's what the
Constitution requires"  is not,  for these  purposes,  a legal argument  about what
the Constitution requires.  It is,  rather,  a political argument.
How does the Constitution card function in political discussions?  It affects
the indirect electoral incentives of the participants.  When the Constitution card
is played,  the President  is saying that  the power  of the  Presidency  should be
increased relative to Congress's,  or Congress is saying that its power should be
increased  relative to the President's.  Constituents are asked to decide which side
is correct,  and depending  on circumstances  and the effectiveness  of the rhetoric
of the way in which the card is played,  members  of Congress will have  greater
or lesser incentives to defend the power of Congress.
My overall conclusion regarding situations where the courts will not review
the actions of the political branches  is that elected officials may properly rely on
principle,  policy,  or politics in deciding  what the  Constitution means  in these
situations,  with two modest and rather weak qualifications:  It probably  would
be  a good idea for elected officials to give rather more  weight to politics  than
to principle  in separation of powers disputes,  and it probably would be a good
idea  for them  to give  somewhat more weight to principle than they otherwise
would when they hear cogent arguments that the courts have made a mistake in
refusing the opportunity to review  their actions.
D.  Situations of Judicial  Review
The  preceding  discussion has  been  aimed  at  the  assumption  that elected
officials  ought to be especially sensitive to constitutional values when they take
actions that the courts will not review,  for if they are not, no one will be.  Yet,
I  suspect  that most  people  would  also  think  that  elected  officials  should be
particularly attentive to the Constitution when judicial review of their actions is
likely.  The  language  of  "flouting  the  Constitution"  seems  attractive  when
elected  officials  do  something  that  they  know  the  courts  will  find
unconstitutional;  it  seems  more  rhetorical  when  they  do  something  that  the
courts will not review.  Further, the arguments about legislature-focused reasons
for refraining  from review  have a  flip side:  If courts  refrain from intervening
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because  they think  that legislators have political incentives  to act  in a manner
consistent with constitutional values,  they often intervene because they mistrust
the political incentives. '  That  lack of trust readily translates into the language
of  constitutional  impropriety.  The  courts  intervene  because  we  know  that
enough legislators will not take constitutional values adequately into account, and
it does not seem wrong to say that a legislator who fails to take those values into
account acts improperly.
I  believe  the  situation  is  much  more  complicated.  Using  Congress's
response  to  Texas  v.  Johnson,"  the  Supreme  Court's  first  flag-burning
decision,  as my primary example,  I will argue  that there are good reasons  for
substantially  discounting  the  courts'  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  when
matters that the courts will eventually consider are before the legislature.  These
reasons,  though,  are  mainly  reasons  grounded  in principle  and policy,  not in
politics  (except  to  the  extent, once  again,  that  there are  political  reasons  for
taking principled stances).
Consider  a  legislator  who  believes  - whether  for  reasons  of principle,
policy, or politics -- that it would be a good thing to adopt a piece of legislation
that  she  believes  the  Supreme  Court  would invalidate  in the  likely  event  of
judicial  review.  Of  course  the  legislator  could  embody  her  proposal  in  a
constitutional amendment,  but that route is cumbersome.  Would the legislator
commit  a constitutional impropriety  if she nonetheless  worked  for its adoption
through  ordinary legislation?  The legislator might insist that the prediction  of
invalidation is less well-founded than might appear.  This could take two forms:
changed circumstances  and distinguishable cases.  In a post-legal  realist world,
it  would  seem  obvious  that  a  legislator  who  can  identify  a  change  in  the
composition  of  the  Supreme  Court  relevant  to  the  issue  of  the  proposal's
constitutionality does not act improperly  in putting the proposal forward.  Nor,
I  think,  must  it  be  overwhelmingly  apparent  that  the  Court  as  presently
constituted  would  in  fact  uphold  a  statute  that  a  prior  Court  would  have
invalidated.  All a legislator needs,  I believe,  is a well-grounded belief that the
present  Court  might uphold  the  statute.  For example,  the  new  member  or
members of the Court need not have expressed themselves  clearly on the issue,
if they have stated general  views about the proper role of the courts that suggest
their willingness to uphold statutes their predecessors  would have struck down.
An interesting variant on this position has been proposed by Senator Daniel
Moynihan  in an article  called,  What Do You Do When the Supreme Court is
Wrong?4  Senator  Moynihan  suggests,  in  a  rather  qualified  way,  that  the
43.  That is the main theme of JOHN ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DIsTRusT (1980).
44.  491  U.S.  397 (1989).
45.  57 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3  (1979).
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legislature can adopt a statute identical to one struck  down by the courts, using
the  legislation  to signal the  depth of its disagreement  with  the courts'  results.
Thereby,  the legislature hopes  to influence  the development of the law, perhaps
to lead  the courts to repudiate their earlier decisions even if the membership  of
the Supreme  Court has not changed.
Sometimes,  though,  the  legislator  could  not  sincerely  believe  that  the
outcome is in doubt.  The decisions to which she objects,  and those that rather
clearly  imply that her  proposal  is unconstitutional,  are recent,  and there have
been no relevant  changes  in the  composition of the  Court.  Further,  she notes
that  some  Justices  have  occasionally  said  that  it is  improper  for  a  court  to
change outcomes merely because of changes in the court's composition,  at least
in  "ordinary"  circumstances  of constitutional  adjudication.'  Whether  this
position is defensible or not, it may be held by the new members  of the Court;
even  a  relevant  change  in composition,  then,  might  not provide  ground  for
believing  that the outcome  would change.
Under these circumstances,  adopting the proposal would be almost, but not
quite, pointless.  Further, adopting it entails some obvious costs.  Suppose,  for
example,  that the statute calls  for the criminal  punishment of people who burn
flags, after Texas v. Johnson, and that the legislator predicts, with a high degree
of confidence,  that the Court will strike down any conviction obtained under the
statute.  Even  so,  defendants  will have  undergone  some  cost,  in  time  and
personal strain (lessened, of course, by precisely the same confidence  they ought
to have that their convictions will not be sustained),  before they prevail.
To what good end?  So far there appear to be only two ends the legislator
will have served.  She will have expressed her disagreement  with the courts in
a  very  forceful  way,  and  she  may have  gained  some  political  advantage  by
standing  up  for the  flag  or by  standing up  against  the  Supreme  Court.  My
personal inclination is to say that these gains are too modest, and that, under the
analysis so far, the legislator has indeed committed a constitutional'impropriety.
But, I acknowledge that, though the gains might be modest,  so too are the costs,
given  the  assumption  that  the  legislator  and  presumably  everyone  else
confidently predicts that the Supreme  Court will invalidate the statute. Perhaps
the  gains,  though  modest,  are  sufficient to justify  the imposition of similarly
modest costs.
Now  imagine  that  the  legislature  repeatedly  adopts,  and  the  courts
repeatedly  strike  down,  statutes  dealing  with  flag-burning.  At  some  point
46.  For a discussion,  see  South Carolina v.  Gathers,  490  U.S.  805,  823  (1989)  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting).
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observers  will  properly  begin  to  describe  the  situation  as  a  "constitutional
crisis."  Or, suppose that, after the Supreme Court issues an opinion saying that
a post-Johnson flag-burning conviction must be vacated  because  the underlying
statute is unconstitutional,  executive  officials simply disregard  the opinion and
continue to  confine the defendant,  even  in  the face of writs  of habeas  corpus.
That surely looks  like a constitutional  crisis.
Not all constitutional crises are bad things, though.  If one believes that the
Supreme  Court  was  wrong  in  a  way  that  went  to  the  core  of  a  proper
understanding of the constitutional order,  perhaps one  should want  to provoke
a constitutional  crisis.  If so,  legislators who engage  in repeated  confrontations
with  the  courts,  and  executive  officials  who  ignore  the  Court's  directives  in
adjudicated  cases,  may not be committing  constitutional  improprieties.  To be
sure,  they are doing something very serious,  which  is likely  to destabilize  the
political  system with unforeseeable  results.  That counsels prudence in pursuing
this course.  I would suppose that elected  officials should provoke constitutional
crises only after they have thought seriously about the course they plan to take,
and,  perhaps more  important for my overall  argument, only if they believe that
a  crisis  is  the  only  way  to  remove  an  obstruction  to  accomplishing  truly
important ends of principle or policy.  I doubt that politics alone is a sufficient
justification  for provoking  a constitutional  crisis,  although  I admit that this  is
little more than an intuitive feeling on my part.
Of  course,  I  have  been  setting  up  the  apparently  more  difficult  line of
analysis.  Most  of the  time,  those  who  disagree  with  the  courts  will  offer
proposals that they believe are distinguishable from the precedents.  Surely there
is no constitutional impropriety in doing  so, even if the only reason for offering
the proposal  is to advance  their proponents'  prospects for re-election.  Thus,  it
would seem important to distinguish between  situations in which the proposals
are  not  distinguishable  from  the  precedents  --  where  the  possibility  of  a
constitutional  impropriety  seems  substantial  according  to  some aspects  of the
analysis I have offered -- and  those in which the proposals are distinguishable-
where  there  is no possibility of a constitutional  impropriety.
I believe  that,  though  legislators  may  perhaps  want  to  be  aware  of  the
possibility  of  distinguishing  a  proposal  from  the  precedents,  they  ought  not
concern  themselves  with that  possibility in  much  detail.  I  think it  helpful  to
frame  this  suggestion  by  talking  about  how  legislators  ought  to  discuss  a
legislative  proposal  once  they  are  aware  of  the  possibility  that  it  is
unconstitutional.
The natural suggestion,  I think, is that they ought  to discuss it in the terms
the courts  have established.  If they conclude  that,  applying the doctrines  the
courts  have  developed,  the  proposal  is  distinguishable,  they  can  go  ahead
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without  fearing  constitutional  impropriety;  they  should  not  go ahead  if they
conclude that, applying the courts' doctrines,  the proposal is not distinguishable.
I want  to challenge  that suggestion.
I  begin  by  repeating  in  this  context  two  points  made  earlier.  Some
substantial  part  of the  courts'  doctrine  consists of  an  assessment  of  policy
considerations of the sort that are routinely part of legislative deliberation.  To
that extent,  the ordinary discourse of legislators will track the courts'  discourse.
In addition,  to some extent the courts'  discourse is structured by the particular
limitations of the courts as institutions, with the effect of generating what I have
called  "court-centered"  reasons  and similar  doctrines.'  Where  the  doctrines
the courts  develop depend  importantly on such institution-specific  concerns,  it
would be positively wrong for legislators to cast their deliberations in the terms
the courts use.4
Reapportionment  provides a useful  example.  The courts  have imposed a
rather  rigid  test  of mathematical  equality,  which  can  be  relaxed  slightly  only
when  a limited number of other considerations  come  into play.  The primary
reason for using such a test is clearly institution-specific:  The courts understand
that the range of considerations that ought,  in democratic theory,  to bear on the
apportionment  decision  is  so  wide  as  to  be  impossible  for  the  courts  to
administer;  they  can  administer  only  a  rule  of mathematical  rigidity.  Now
consider a legislator who disagrees  with the courts' treatment of apportionment
cases  and  who  proposes  some  apportionment  that,  the  legislator  sincerely
believes,  is  distinguishable  from apportionments  the courts  have disapproved
before.  I see  no reason  why that legislator ought to worry  about whether  the
proposed  apportionment  satisfies  even  a  relaxed  standard  of  mathematical
equality except to  the extent that the legislator believes,  independently of what
the  courts  have  said,  that  mathematical  equality  is  something  that  a  sound
apportionment  would achieve.
I  confess  to  some  uncertainty  about  the  range  of  institution-specific
47.  For  a  more  general  examination  of this  phenomenon,  see  Lawrence  G.  Sager,  Fair
Measure:  The Status of Underenforced  Constitutional Norms, 91  HARV.  L.  REV.  1212 (1978).
48.  Perhaps the most effective examples of this phenomenon come  from an area  with which  I
am  not concerned with  here, where a  legislator disagrees with  a judicial finding that some practice
is constitutionally permissible, and argues for  legislation outlawing the practice on the ground  that
the practice  is really unconstitutional despite  what the courts have said.  For example, in the Equal
Protection context the courts have relied  in part on institution-specific  concerns to  invalidate  only
badly  motivated  laws.  See,  e.g.,  Washington  v.  Davis,  426  U.S.  229  (1976);  Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S.  256 (1979).  Yet, a legislator ought to be able to argue that laws
with  a disparate  impact ought to be repealed because  they violate the Constitution even if they are
not badly motivated, at least to the extent that the  courts'  reasons  for using the motivation test  are
institution-specific.
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concerns that have structured constitutional doctrine.  I am inclined to think that
it is quite broad,  that is, that a great deal of the constitutional law that the courts
have  articulated  involves  doctrines  that  respond  in  large  measure  not  to
underlying questions of constitutional values but to concerns about the capacity
of the  courts  to  administer alternative  doctrines.  If that suspicion is  correct,
legislators  could  debate  proposals  without  substantial  reference  to  what  the
courts have  said even if judicial review of their product is likely.
Suppose,  though,  that  we  can  identify  a  constitutional  doctrine  that  is
directly  responsive to  constitutional  values  and not substantially  responsive  to
institution-specific  concerns.  For our  purposes,  I  will use  a  distinction  that
played a prominent role in the post-Johnson  debates,  that between content-based
and content-neutral regulation of expressive activity.  Johnson suggested that the
vice  with the Texas  statute invalidated  there was  that it was  content-based,  at
least  in the sense that liability was imposed on the basis of the  likely response
of an  audience to the content of the message  carried by  the flag's destruction.
When  Congress  considered  its  response  to Johnson,  Senator  Joseph  Biden
attempted to write a statute that respected the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral statutes.  It was not, I think, an edifying experience,  except
by  negative example.
There  were  two problems  with Senator  Biden's effort.  First, it  was not
clear throughout the drafting process that he or other Senators really understood
the distinction, and this not because they lacked legal sophistication themselves
or  through  the advice  they  received  from  prominent legal  scholars.  Senator
Biden  took the position,  understandable  enough given the terms  the Court has
used,  that a law was content-neutral if it applied to an activity that was defined
without reference  to content, that is, without reference  to what the actor meant
or to  what  the  audience  took  the  action  to  mean.  On  this  view,  it  was the
content  of  the  action  that  mattered.  Unfortunately  for  Senator  Biden,  the
definition  of content-neutrality  was  ultimately  in  the  hands  of the  Supreme
Court,  and the Justices adopted an alternative, equally defensible understanding
of content-neutrality.  The Court held in United States v.  Eichman that Senator
Biden's statute was not content-neutral because the only sensible purpose offered
in support of the statute implicated  the content of the action  of flag-burning;, 9
that  is,  the  only  reason  Congress  sensibly  could  have  for  prohibiting  flag-
burning is to suppress  the message  that some burnings conveyed.
The lesson of the debates  over content-neutrality  and  flag-burning,  then,
may be that even  sincere efforts  to cast  legislative discussions in  the terms set
by  the courts  can be futile.  That is particularly  true where,  as  is the case by
49.  110S.  Ct. 2404(1990).
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hypothesis,  some legislators are motivated by  their disagreement  with what the
courts have said.  On the legislators'  side,  with the best will in the world,  they
still may  find  it difficult to  take seriously a doctrinal  framework  that,  in  their
view,  so misled the courts.  And,  on the courts'  side,  again with the best will
in  the  world,  the judges  still  may  be  left with  a  nagging  suspicion  that  the
doctrinal  terms  the legislators used  really were not what they  cared about.
As,  indeed,  is true.  That is the second  problem that the  debate over the
response  to Johnson illustrates.  I  doubt  that  anyone except  perhaps  Senator
Biden himself really  cared  about whether  Congress's  response  to Johnson was
content-neutral  or content-based.  Those were the terms  forced on members  of
Congress  by  the Supreme  Court.  Using  those terms  concealed  what  mattered
to  the  legislators.  If we  believe  that  candor  in  constitutional  discussions  is
desirable,  I think we ought to refrain from developing norms that systematically
lead legislators to talk about constitutional issues in terms that do not reveal their
true concerns.
Finally,  when legislators  cast their discussions in the terms defined by the
courts,  we  may  lose  their  insights  into  the  values  that  the  courts  have
overridden."  As  I  have already  suggested,  this may  be most  apparent where
the courts  apply a balancing  test,  and the  legislators may  offer a different  and
enhanced view of the values that lost out in the judicial balance.  But, I think the
phenomenon occurs as well in cases of pure principle.  The principles the courts
articulate condense a set of social values even if the courts do not speak in terms
of balancing.
In the flag-burning controversy,  for example,  the Supreme Court's opinions
rather  clearly did not fully capture  the true depth of the feeling  that something
extraordinarily  serious was  at stake when flags were burned.  Justice Brennan's
opinion  offered  a  verbal  acknowledgement  of  those  feelings,  but  it was  too
50.  There is a subsidiary point here.  Many legislators are not lawyers, and may  find it difficult
to engage in a sensible discussion on the terms the courts have set.  For a plaintive quotation to this
effect  by Senator Mansfield,  see Abner Mikva,  How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution, 61  N.C.  L.  REV.  587,  602  (1983).  Mikva  also  argues that  many  legislators  have
incentives not to examine the constitutional questions, id. at 609,  and that, for a number of reasons,
there are  "questions  concerning Congress'  ability to  make  constitutional judgments."  Id.  at 590.
Louis Fisher, Constitutional  Interpretation  by Members of Congress, 63  N.C.  L.  REV.  707 (1985),
responds that members of Congress have a  somewhat better chance of doing an adequate job than
Mikva claims, because of their ability to gather facts and, perhaps more important,  because of recent
changes in  the staffing  and organization of Congress.  Id. at 728,  730.  For my  purposes, these
discussions are  somewhat off the point.  I am concerned primarily  with defending the proposition
that non-judicial officials not only need not refer to judicial interpretations of the Constitution when
they  make their  decisions but  may  indeed  refer primarily to  political considerations  of a  sort that
would be entirely out of bounds if a judge referred  to them explicitly.
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abstract.  Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Texas  v. Johnson, in contrast, was
obviously passionate,  but precisely because he had to quote poetry to make  his
point,  his opinion somehow  seemed  inappropriate  for the pages of the United
States  Reports.5'  But,  in  some  ways  more  interesting,  there  was something
else the Court's opinions could not adequately  express and legislators could:  the
feeling of commitment  to the principles of the Constitution.  When members of
the  Supreme  Court  say  they  are  doing  something  because  the  Constitution
requires it, as Justice Kennedy did, there is a certain kind of self-interest at stake
that weakens  the  force of the  claim.52  When  members  of Congress  say  that
they should not amend  the Constitution  to deal  with flag-burning  because  the
values of free speech  are too important to tinker with,  there may be something
a bit askew  in  their rhetoric,53  but  it seems  to  me  clear  that  they  contribute
something distinctive to discussion of the meaning of the Constitution.
None  of this  suggests,  of course,  that  legislators  should  never  use  the
doctrinal  terms the courts have developed.  Legislators may be convinced,  by
independent reflection on the Constitution or by reading what the courts say, that
the doctrines the courts use actually are responsive  to the fundamental values of
the  Constitution.  Any  legislator  who  believes  that  the  courts'  doctrines
accurately  identify the  relevant considerations of principle and policy should of
course use those terms in discussing alternatives to  the courts'  decisions.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Much of the preceding analysis consists of drawing distinctions and defining
different categories  of problems.  I have tried to show that in many  categories,
elected officials can make their decisions in matters of constitutional concern by
relying on political concerns.  Where policy and,  in particular, principle come
into  play  outside  the  courts,  they  have  a  relatively  small  role.  There  is  a
residual  category  in  which  what  the  courts  have  said  about  the  Constitution
properly  plays  a substantial  role in discussions of the Constitution  outside the
courts.  But,  I have tried  to suggest,  that residual category  contains  relatively
few interesting cases.
In short, the courts have little to do with the Constitution outside the courts.
51.  See,  e.g.,  Sheldon H. Nahmod,  The Sacred Flag and the First  Amenrdmen,  66  IND.  L.J.
511  (1991).
52.  In Justice Kennedy's case, the statement is certainly a  little odd because what was at stake
was what the Constitution meant, and if Justice Kennedy believed that fundamental values were  not
infringed  by statutes prohibiting flag-burning,  his saying  so would have meant that they were  not
(given the Court's 5-4 division).
53.  Because proponents of an amendment could have claimed that they were not trying to tinker
with principles of free speech but were simply trying to correct the Court's erroneous specification
of those principles.
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